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 Abstract 
 
 
The banking system is regarded as a mechanism that can covert the impact of the financial 
market development into growth. The amount of credit that the banking sector makes available 
for productive uses is one of the most significant measures of financial development.  
Our paper tests the importance of banking competition for firms’ access to finance following the 
original contribution by Thorsten, Asly and Vojislav (2004) for a cross-section of 22 emerging 
and developing countries. By conducting the regression test with new period of data, we try to 
explore how banking competition after financial crisis impact firms access to credit, especially in 
the developing and emerging countries.   
Through regression, we conclude that with more bank concentration firms face fewer financing 
obstacles, and large enterprises can access credit easier than small and medium enterprises. Our 
results provide evidence for theories that focus on the potential positive effects of bank 
concentration which is inconsistent with theories that stress the negative effects of bank power. 
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Introduction  
	  
The banking system is regarded as a mechanism that can covert the impact of the financial 
market development into growth. The amount of credit that the banking sector makes available 
for productive uses is one of the most significant measures of financial development. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that any deviation from perfect competition in the credit market 
introduces inefficiencies that would harm firm’s access to credit, thus hindering growth. Cetorelli 
and Gambera(2001) finds that concentration in the banking sector determines a general 
deadweight loss that depresses growth and also bank concentration promotes the growth of those 
industries that are more in need of external finance by facilitating credit access to firms, 
especially younger ones. However, some recent contributions have pointed out that banks with 
monopolisticy power have a greater incentive to establish lending relationships with their client 
firms, thus facilitating their access to credit lines.  
Our paper tests the importance of banking competition for firms’ access to finance following the 
original contribution by Thorsten, Asly and Vojislav (2004) for a cross-section of 22 emerging 
and developing countries. Banking crises in emerging markets in the 1990s were associated with 
major macroeconomic disruptions. The financial crisis indicated importance of regulatory and 
competition policies in the banking sector, which were underappreciated before the crisis.  
Therefore, our intention is to update the data from 1999 to 2011 and to explore how banking 
competition after financial crisis impact firms access to credit, especially in the developing and 
emerging countries.   
Our results provide evidence that in more concentrated banking markets, firms of all sizes face 
lower financing obstacles, which is the opposite view of the original contribution. Also largest 
firm face the lowest financing obstacles, which is consistent with the original paper, while some 
theories predict a positive impact of bank concentration on alleviating financing obstacles for 
small firms and allowing them access to credit. Beck et al. (2005a) find a robust positive 
relationship between the relative size of the small and medium enterprises and economic growth 
after controlling for other growth determinants. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001a) 
find that small firms are more significantly influenced but this influence is dampened in 
countries with higher levels of financial and institutional development.  
Public bank ownership, a high degree of government interference in the banking system and 
restrictions on banks’ activities do contribute to increasing the performance of industries that 
demand more credit and help promote growth of industries that lack collateral. On the other hand, 
private banks have a significant impact on the interaction of bank concentration with financing 
obstacles.  
Our paper uses the methodology and sources of data provided in the original paper and also 
makes several data improvements. This paper uses cross-country data from developing and 
emerging economies and also includes a broad cross section of countries and firms of different 
sizes. The original paper has studied how bank concentration impacts by using firm level data 
from the World Business Environment Survey (WBES), a major cross-sectional firm level 
survey, which has the assessment of growth obstacles as perceived by firms of different sizes. 
Upon that, we also test what level of financing obstacles different sectors face. Cetorelli and 
Gambera (2001) show that industries that depend more on external finance grow relatively faster 
in more concentrated sectors.  
Also, we follow the Thorsten, Asly and Vojislav (2004) that not only exploits cross-country 
variance in bank concentration but also in the regulatory environment and the ownership 
structure of the banking sector. Here we use data from Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001), which is 
not updated to 2011 due to unavailability of data. In terms of the ownership structure of the 
banking system, we find many firms in our data sample are domestically-owned. So we added 
domestically-owned as a dummy variable into our regression. Clarke, Cull and Martinez Peria 
(2001) show that a larger foreign bank presence decreases financing obstacles and increases the 
share of investment financed with bank finance.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses the recent studies on the 
role of banking system on economic development and impacts of banking concentration on 
enterprises growth. Section 2 introduces the variables we use and the sources of data. Section 3 
describes the methodology we apply. Section 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
	  
	  
Literature review 
	  
Modern development theories increasingly emphasize the key role of access to finance. As 
surveyed by Levine (2005), a large body of literature has shown the importance of efficient 
financial systems and easy access to finance for economic development. Beck et al. (2007) find 
that nations with better developed financial systems and easier access to finance not only have 
faster economic growth but also have lower economic inequality and thus greater benefits for the 
poorer population. Rajan (2012) shows that easier access to financing is positively associated 
with greater national wealth and greater government favoritism toward selected firms.  
Previous research has suggested that competition promotes growth (Cetorelli, 2004; Cetorelli and 
Strahan 2006), Black and Strahan (2002) find evidence across US states that higher 
concentration results in less new firm formation, especially in states and periods with regulated 
banking markets. Competition can drive banks to reduce their lending costs, which can lead to an 
increase in demand for bank funds in order to support business and growth. It has also been 
argued that increased market power in combination with less competition can help relax external 
financing constraints on non-financial firms (Petersen and Rajan, 1995). Beck st al (2006) finds 
that bank concentration increases financial stability after controlling for countries’ regulation and 
institutions.  
Claessens and Laeven (2005) found that sectors heavily dependent on bank financing grow faster 
in countries where there is fierce banking competition, while Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara 
(2006) suggest that the exercise of market power enhances economic growth, supporting the 
lending relationship argument, with the implication that bank competition may have a negative 
impact on the availability of funds for industries. However, Petersen and Rajan has observed that 
external-financing-depend industries experience a slowdown in growth when competition in 
banking sector is high, as banks find it less attractive to invest in the lending relationship. 
Claessens and Laeven (2005) find similar results using direct measures of bank competition.  
The ownership structure of banks might also influence the relation between market power access 
and costs of external financing. Domestically owned banks might have more information and 
better enforcement mechanisms than foreign-owned banks and so might be more willing to lend 
to opaque borrowers. Government-owned banks are mostly not pursuing maximizing profit and 
often have the explicit mandate to lend to certain groups of borrowers.  
While cross-country research sheds doubt on a causal link between SMEs (small and medium-
size enterprises) and economic development, there is substantial evidence that small firms face 
larger growth constraints and have less access to formal sources of external finance. Beck et al. 
(2005a) find a robust, positive relationship between the relative size of the SME sector and 
economic growth, after controlling for other growth determinants. Financial development allows 
existing firms to exploit growth and investment opportunities and to achieve larger equilibrium 
size. Small firms do not only report higher financing obstacles in their operation and growth, 
they are also more adversely affected by these obstacles in their operation and growth.  
There are a number of recent cross-country studies highlighting the importance of bank 
regulation and supervision for the functioning and development of banking system. Pasiouras 
(2008) mentioned that stricter capital adequacy; powerful supervision and market discipline 
power promote technical efficiency. Economic theory provides conflicting predictions about the 
impact of regulatory and supervisory policies on bank performance (e.g. Barth el at, 2004 and 
Barth el at, 2007a). They also show that policies that rely excessively on official supervision and 
restrictions on bank activities are worse for financial development and stability. By limiting 
banks’ activities, regulatory restrictions could also impede banks’ ability to diversify income 
streams and reduce the franchise value of the bank, which may limit the incentive for efficient 
behaviors. 
Using a panel data set of developing countries and of firms of different sizes, we will test: 
1. Is bank concentration in developing and emerging economies positively or negatively related 
to financing obstacles? 
2. Does the relation between concentration and financing obstacles vary across firms of 
different sizes? 
3. Does the relation between concentration and financing obstacles vary across different 
regulatory regimes, ownership structures, and institutional environments? 
 
 
 
Data and Summary Statistics 
	  
We follow the approach introduced by Thorsten, Asly and Vojislav (2004), who focus on 
analyzing the effect of bank concentration on financing access and the influence of other 
variables on the relations between them. The data in our research primarily comes from three 
different main resources.  The firm level data is obtained from The World Bank’s Enterprise 
Surveys, while bank concentration indicator can be found from BankScope. Country-level data is 
sourced from Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2013) and The World Bank. The World Bank surveys 
on bank regulation, which is conducted every four years from 1999, provides most of the 
regulatory indicators of the banking industry. 
The enterprise survey is actually an updated version of WBES, and provides the most 
comprehensive firm-level data in emerging and developing economics. The survey record items 
like sales, ownership, operation, financing pattern, but simplifies some of the questions like 
“access to finance”. Also, the survey minimizes measurement error and yields comparable data 
across country after using standardized instrument and uniform sampling methodology. 
Therefore, survey results from different regions will not be driven by differences in cultural, 
institutional and political environment. With 130,000 firm data series from 135 countries, we try 
to find the most complete information among them and eventually narrow the data down to 
12,933 firms. Table 1 presents the country-level variables for 71 developing and emerging 
countries.  
Apart from evaluating the financing availability and efficiency from various aspects, the 
survey sticks strictly to the core content of investigation and utilizes a straightforward 
questioning: “ In access to financing, which includes availability and cost (interest rates, fees and 
collateral requirements), how much obstacle is there to the current operations of this 
establishment? ” The answer varies from No obstacle (0), Minor obstacle (1), Moderate obstacle 
(2), a Major obstacle (3), and a Very Severe obstacle (4). 
 
 
 
 
Table 1                         
BANKING MARKET STRUCTURE AND  FINANCING OBSTACLES 
Country  Concentration Restrict 
Banking 
freedom 
     Inflation 
rate 
private 
credit  
credit 
registry 
Institutional 
Development 
Fraction 
Denied 
GDP per 
capita 
foreign 
bank 
share 
public 
bank 
share 
Growth 
rate 
Angola 78.51 8.00 47.70 13.47 20.18 1.80 -0.28 0.00 5159.23 58.70 18.72 0.22 
Armenia 45.81 12.00 68.86 7.65 35.37 23.70 0.56 0.00 3421.70 67.45 0.00 0.10 
Australia 77.00 8.00 82.03 3.39 123.20 0.00 0.52 0.00 62080.98 13.30 0.00 0.20 
Bangladesh 38.19 14.00 54.06 10.70 48.82 0.60 -0.90 1.00 732.07 6.59 34.07 0.10 
Belarus 83.50 9.00 50.13 53.23 39.25 49.50 -0.43 0.00 6305.77 27.30 71.70 0.08 
Bhutan 100.00 8.00 56.71 8.85 47.09 6.40 0.27 0.25 2523.67 5.54 47.56 0.14 
Botswana 91.70 12.00 72.04 8.46 27.52 0.00 0.50 0.50 7697.40 92.90 7.10 0.10 
Brazil 70.55 5.00 56.86 6.64 61.35 36.10 -0.19 0.05 12576.20 17.67 43.52 0.15 
Bulgaria 54.49 7.00 65.69 4.22 72.05 52.80 -0.61 0.11 7286.39 80.73 3.22 0.13 
Burundi 87.04 9.00 51.42 9.74 20.79 0.30 -0.97 0.25 246.91 16.28 48.92 0.12 
Chile 73.71 14.00 78.73 3.34 101.55 35.60 0.51 0.00 14510.97 39.40 19.46 0.14 
Colombia 63.40 12.00 70.70 3.41 44.72 0.00 -0.94 0.00 7124.55 19.80 6.00 0.15 
Costa Rica 77.95 12.00 66.92 4.88 47.15 25.50 0.52 0.00 8704.11 30.92 53.69 0.12 
Croatia 75.23 8.00 60.37 2.25 71.10 0.00 0.66 0.63 14371.95 88.77 4.19 0.08 
Cyprus 69.40 11.00 67.64 3.29 296.46 0.00 1.33 0.18 29206.51 35.33 1.18 0.05 
Dominican 
Republic 87.27 8.00 61.31 8.46 24.01 35.90 -0.80 0.00 5462.70 8.45 31.43 0.07 
Ecuador 70.16 12.00 48.03 4.47 27.49 0.00 -0.50 0.25 5035.24 2.13 16.53 0.12 
El Salvador 84.66 5.00 66.16 5.13 39.75 23.90 -0.81 0.00 3698.55 92.95 5.96 0.07 
Estonia 93.00 9.00 75.88 4.98 83.34 0.00 0.29 0.00 16982.30 99.00 0.00 0.19 
Fiji 100.00 13.00 58.69 8.67 75.84 0.00 0.23 0.25 4324.69 100.00 0.00 0.15 
Finland 91.00 7.00 73.42 3.42 97.04 0.00 0.78 0.00 48694.54 74.00 0.00 0.10 
France 86.80 11.00 63.46 2.12 115.90 43.30 0.38 0.00 42578.18 12.32 1.58 0.08 
Ghana 44.99 11.00 64.25 8.73 15.05 0.00 0.26 0.00 1594.03 50.97 9.72 0.20 
Greece 77.50 8.00 55.71 3.33 121.88 0.00 -0.16 0.00 26061.44 20.90 10.80 -0.01 
Guatemala 79.50 13.00 61.17 6.22 23.57 17.30 -0.36 0.13 3240.37 10.30 1.80 0.12 
Hungary 63.00 7.00 67.00 3.96 66.21 0.00 0.17 0.02 13784.18 82.83 3.94 0.08 
Iceland 100.00 7.00 72.42 3.99 97.22 0.00 0.20 0.00 44019.39 0.00 40.51 0.08 
India 37.62 13.00 55.66 8.86 49.73 0.00 -0.91 0.70 1539.61 7.19 73.70 0.09 
Indonesia 50.30 10.00 58.50 5.36 31.75 31.80 -0.06 0.08 3469.75 34.18 38.41 0.18 
Ireland 72.40 5.00 76.19 2.58 199.73 0.00 1.11 0.00 49387.27 62.90 20.69 0.08 
Israel 94.00 14.00 68.44 3.46 89.46 0.00 0.63 0.00 33250.51 2.60 0.00 0.09 
Italy 65.60 10.00 60.95 2.74 122.59 23.00 0.79 0.20 36988.16 17.90 0.05 0.07 
Jamaica 94.70 8.00 66.72 7.53 26.82 0.00 0.62 0.67 5346.22 95.10 0.00 0.09 
Kenya 50.00 10.00 57.12 14.02 37.38 0.00 -1.08 0.00 816.44 37.20 4.80 0.03 
Korea, Rep. 79.60 12.00 1.00 4.00 138.13 0.00 0.38 0.00 24155.83 76.80 22.30 0.09 
Latvia 59.30 7.00 68.66 4.38 82.02 59.70 0.31 0.09 13827.36 69.00 15.50 0.21 
Lithuania 80.30 9.00 73.00 4.13 53.24 15.00 0.74 0.00 14227.69 80.50 0.00 0.20 
Luxembourg 30.80 10.00 74.20 3.41 174.35 0.00 0.85 0.00 11913.18 94.00 5.20 0.09 
Madagascar 82.00 12.00 61.74 9.48 11.06 0.10 -0.17 0.14 454.54 100.00 0.00 0.10 
Malawi 82.50 12.00 55.41 7.62 19.81 0.00 -0.33 0.00 364.09 29.10 9.30 0.01 
Maldives 97.80 9.00 51.04 12.83 54.42 17.70 0.31 0.00 6515.74 61.30 38.70 -0.01 
Malta 71.00 12.00 66.41 2.72 127.77 0.00 1.00 0.00 22346.32 86.00 0.00 0.13 
Mauritius 65.00 14.00 76.51 6.53 91.42 49.80 0.39 0.00 8749.58 68.00 1.00 0.15 
Moldova 69.30 13.00 57.28 7.61 33.56 0.00 -0.02 0.00 1970.84 41.50 12.50 0.21 
Mozambique 91.61 10.00 54.97 10.35 24.37 3.80 0.50 0.00 510.46 91.61 0.00 0.32 
             
 
TABLE 1 
CONTINUED 
Country  Concentration Restrict Banking freedom 
Inflation 
rate 
private 
credit  
credit 
registry 
Institutional 
Development 
Fraction 
Denied 
GDP per 
capita 
foreign 
bank 
share 
public 
bank 
share 
Growth 
rate 
Namibia 100.00 8.00 59.42 5.05 49.15 0.00 -0.20 0.75 5614.93 86.33 0.00 0.10 
Nepal 26.18 13.00 50.15 9.27 52.95 0.00 -1.03 0.00 694.14 17.49 24.31 0.17 
Norway 76.00 7.00 70.91 1.30  0.00 0.72 0.00 99091.09 29.50 0.00 0.15 
Pakistan 51.00 11.00 55.16 11.92 18.12 6.90 0.03 0.00 1212.98 58.50 21.00 0.19 
Panama 47.20 12.00 63.37 5.88 84.64 0.00 0.18 0.00 8895.18 62.08 11.00 0.14 
Paraguay 66.91 5.00 61.97 8.25 38.94 15.70 -0.68 0.00 3814.21 40.37 6.05 0.23 
Peru 87.20 8.00 67.45 3.37 27.33 28.50 -0.38 0.00 5759.40 48.60 0.00 0.13 
Poland 49.20 15.00 67.02 4.26 54.82 0.00 0.76 0.04 13384.78 62.00 22.00 0.09 
Portugal 74.20 7.00 63.47 3.65 192.10 86.20 0.83 0.02 22532.51 22.14 22.64 0.04 
Romania 56.80 5.00 65.50 5.79 44.50 15.20 0.10 0.14 9063.68 84.10 7.90 0.11 
Serbia 45.10 10.00 59.41 11.14 50.51 0.00 -1.14 0.00 6047.74 73.50 17.90 0.19 
Seychelles 94.00 14.00 56.16 2.56 25.96 0.00 0.08 0.50 12117.81 69.00 31.00 0.12 
Sierra 
Leone 73.79 7.00 50.53 16.19 7.69 0.00 -0.26 0.29 499.92 62.29 37.71 0.12 
Slovenia 60.40 9.00 62.70 1.81 90.07 3.30 0.62 0.00 24478.32 28.42 51.12 0.07 
South 
Africa 91.57 8.00 62.48 5.28 143.93 0.00 0.70 0.50 7830.51 27.85 0.07 0.09 
Spain 64.00 7.00 67.25 3.20 209.24 54.70 1.02 0.00 31117.90 8.00 0.00 0.05 
Sri Lanka 72.70 8.00 59.98 6.72 30.64 0.00 -0.58 0.57 2835.69 14.20 59.10 0.18 
Suriname 87.80 6.00 54.18 17.71 23.98 0.00 0.05 0.00 8236.20 21.00 33.20 -0.01 
Switzerland 66.60 4.00 81.57 0.23 169.85 0.00 0.86 0.17 83270.24 11.80 16.10 0.05 
Tanzania 64.00 6.00 57.76 12.69 17.77 0.00 -0.36 0.00 530.39 49.03 4.72 0.01 
Thailand 63.18 12.00 63.35 3.81 140.34 0.00 -0.06 0.00 5192.12 6.80 17.50 0.08 
Turkey 60.14 13.00 64.86 6.47 53.11 23.80 -0.31 0.11 10604.55 16.56 31.60 0.05 
Uganda 60.73 16.00 59.91 18.69 18.60 0.00 -1.04 0.17 440.80 75.16 3.21 -0.07 
Ukraine 36.80 7.00 49.30 7.96 70.96 0.00 -0.81 0.43 3575.49 47.80 16.90 0.20 
Uruguay 74.50 13.00 69.32 8.09 23.42 28.60 0.77 0.00 13960.96 54.36 45.61 0.21 
Vanuatu 100.00 14.00 59.47 0.86 67.98 0.00 -0.03 0.00 3249.86 86.40 13.60 0.10 
             
	  
NOTES: Concentration is share of 5 largest banks in banking system in terms of both deposits. Restrict is the measure of the 
extent to which the bank financial activities. Banking freedom is the degree of government interference in the banking system. 
Inflation rate takes the value of 2011. Private credit refers to the financial credit offered to private sector by financial institution 
as share of GDP. Credit Registry is the number of individuals and firms listed in private or public registry as share of population. 
Institution development is the average indicator of voice and accountability, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption, 
political stabilities, and effectiveness of government respectively. Fraction denied is the indicator of government’s restriction to 
enter the bank sector. Foreign bank share measures the percent of the banking system's assets in banks that are foreign-controlled 
and public bank share describes the percent of the banking system's assets in banks that are public-controlled. GDP per capital 
takes the natural logarithm of 2011 country data. Growth rate is the percent in 2011. 
	  
Since each firm evaluates its access to credit differently based on the financing process and 
related policy, the average score for each country also differs from one another. Overall, 53% of 
the establishments don’t face any obstacle when they seek credit from banks, 20% out of 12933 
establishments come across minor to moderate financing obstacles, whereas 27% of 
establishments feel major to severe financing obstacles during their business operation. 
The indicators here are generally the same as those in Thorsten, Asly and Vojislav (2004) as we 
try to replicate the approach and further explore the link between market structure and access to 
credit based on the new period of data. However, we also improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of regression procedure by selecting more appropriate dependent variables and 
redefining the existed ones. In terms of the firm-level data, we add Domestic which take on a 
value of one if the firm is owned by private domestic individuals, companies or organizations. 
Likewise, government takes on a value of one if the firm is owned by state or government, and 
foreign takes on a value of one if the firm is owned by private foreign individuals, companies or 
organizations. In our data sample, 94% of firms are domestically-owned, 9% are foreign-owned, 
and the rest government-owned. We also control the industry that each firm is operating in by 
taking the sector as dummy variables. Manufacturing include food, textile, garments, etc; Service 
includes retail, IT, restaurant and hotel. We decide to abandon the variable “exporting” after 
observing the insignificant result in Thorsten, Asly and Vojislav (2004), as to facilitate the 
following regression process. 52% of our sample firms are in the manufacturing industry and 43% 
of them are in service industry. Instead of using “number of competitors” as it can only reflect 
one aspect of the competition environment, we rely on the survey question: “Do you think that 
the practices of competitors in the informal sector are No Obstacle, a Minor Obstacle, a Major 
Obstacle, or a Very Severe Obstacle to the current operations of this establishment?” The five 
options correspond to 0 to 4 respectively. Overall, 8% of all firms in the sample report 
competition as a very severe obstacle, 13% as a major obstacle, 18% as a moderate obstacle, and 
55% as no or minor obstacle. Sales is also a firm attribute to be controlled for, and we take the 
log of sales to better fit the regression model. As Table 2 (panel A) shows, sales (log) of the 
firms in our sample range from 0 to 37.8 with an average of 16.63. The correlation analysis in 
Table 2 indicates that domestic firms, small firms (measure by sales), and firms facing more 
competition will come across trouble when ask for financial credit.  
The bank concentration is the main bank-level indicator we need to collect for each country. The 
World Bank survey on bank regulation presents data on the share of 5 largest banks in banking 
system in terms of both deposit and asset. We calculate the concentration based on deposit, 
however, as is the case with most data collection endeavors, the survey methodology has some 
limitations. First, rather than covering any non-regulated credit providers, the survey can only 
collect information of regulated financial institutions. This will very likely underestimate the 
scale of financial credit providers as the loan is often carried out by non-regulated providers in 
the developing and emerging countries. Second, there might be measurement error as different 
definition and environment across countries which affect the uniformity of the answer. However, 
since the BankScope suffers from the coverage issue, we eventually decide to choose survey 
answer over the BankScope. According to our sample report, the bank concentration has 
substantial variation between countries. Guernsey has five largest banks occupying only 11.6% 
of banking system, while Fiji’s top five take the whole market, with indicator as high as 100%.  
 
Table 2 
SUMMARY STATISTICS AND CORRELATION 
A. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std dev. Max Min 	  	  
	  	  
General Financing 
obstacle 29921 1.20 0 1.44 4 0 
	    Government  29921 0.86 0 7.68 100 0 
	    Foreign 29921 5.71 0 21.44 100 0 
	    Manufacturing  29921 0.47 0 0.50 1 0 
	    Service 29921 0.47 0 0.50 1 0 
	    Other 29921 0.07 0 0.25 1 0 
	    Sales 29921 16.63 16.52 2.98 37.08 0 
	    Competition 29921 1.07 0 1.42 4 0 
	    Concentration (%) 180 47.85 72.70 19.40 100.00 11.60 
	    Restrict 204 10.01 10.00 2.94 16.00 4.00 
	    Fraction denied 180 0.13 0.00 0.22 1.00 0.00 
	    Banking freedom 204 60.28 60.02 11.38 90.14 1.00 
	    Credit Registry 258 8.19 0.60 14.37 86.20 0.00 
	    Institutional 
development 215 -0.02 -0.04 0.71 2.07 -1.73 
	    GDP per capita 225 14945.94 5704.98 22563.94 163025.86 246.91 
	    Private Credit (%) 258 60.99 44.79 51.53 296.46 4.36 
	    Foreign bank share (%) 180 32.07 48.60 33.52 100.00 0.00 
	    Public bank share (%) 180 10.04 8.85 17.98 73.70 0.00 
	    Inflation 214 6.82 5.02 6.83 53.23 -3.70 
	    Growth 204 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.39 -0.54 	  	   	  	  
 
 
TABLE 2 
CONTINUED 
B. Correlation Between Firm-Level Variables 
  Financing Obstacle Government  Foreign Manufacturing  Service Sales Competition   
Domestic 0.05 -0.03 -0.64 -0.02 -0.02 -0.11 0.03 
 Government  -0.03 1.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.13 -0.03 
 Foreign -0.05 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.02 0.15 -0.04 
 Manufacturing  -0.01 0.00 0.02 1.00 0.99 0.01 0.00 
 Service -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.99 1.00 0.00 0.00 
 Sales -0.04 0.13 0.15 0.01 0.00 1.00 -0.04 
 Competition 0.25 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.04 1.00 
 Concentration -0.13 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.02   
 
C.  Correlation Between Country-Level Variables 
       
  Concentration Restrict 
Fraction 
Denied 
Economic 
Freedom 
credit 
registry 
Institutional 
Development 
GDP 
per 
capita 
Private 
Credit 
foreign
-owned 
share 
public-
owned 
share 
inflation 
rate 
Restrict -0.23 1.00                   
Fraction Denied -0.31 0.19 1.00         
Economic 
Freedom 0.48 -0.02 -0.44 1.00        
credit registry 0.22 -0.17 -0.24 0.29 1.00       Institutional 
Development 0.42 -0.17 -0.36 0.71 0.20 1.00      
GDP per capita 0.36 -0.19 -0.27 0.60 0.35 0.66 1.00     
Private Credit -0.16 -0.22 0.15 0.06 0.29 0.15 0.69 1.00    
foreign-owned 
share 0.42 -0.32 -0.44 0.49 0.02 0.44 0.25 -0.03 1.00   
public-owned 
share -0.02 0.14 0.37 -0.33 0.20 -0.19 0.09 0.16 -0.73 1.00  
Inflation 0.17 0.08 -0.07 -0.44 0.24 -0.35 -0.34 -0.34 -0.16 0.35 1.00 
Growth -0.17 -0.31 0.09 -0.04 0.02 0.17 0.06 0.31 0.04 0.10 -0.27 
 
NOTES: Table A presents the basic statistic of all the variables while table B and C describe the correlation between firm-level 
and country-level variables. Financing obstacle is the numerical response of the question: In access to financing, which includes 
availability and cost (interest rates, fees and collateral requirements), how much obstacle is there to the current operations of this 
establishment? Domestic, Government and Foreign are dummy variables that take on one if the firm is owned by domestic, 
government or foreign organization. Manufacture and service takes on 1 f firm operates in manufacturing or service industry, 0 if 
not. Sale is the natural logarithm of 2011 firm data. Competition is the numeric response of question: “Do you think that the 
practices of competitors in the informal sector are No Obstacle, a Minor Obstacle, a Major Obstacle, or a Very Severe Obstacle to 
the current operations of this establishment?” Concentration is the share of 5 largest banks in banking system in terms of deposits. 
Restrict is the measure of the extent to which the bank financial activities. Banking freedom is the degree of government 
interference in the banking system. Inflation rate takes the value of 2011. Private credit refers to the financial credit offered to 
private sector by financial institution as share of GDP. Credit Registry is the number of individuals and firms listed in private or 
public registry as share of population. Institution development is the average indicator of voice and accountability, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, control of corruption, political stabilities, and effectiveness of government respectively. Fraction denied is 
the indicator of government’s restriction to enter the bank sector. Foreign bank share measures the percent of the banking 
system's assets in banks that are foreign-controlled and public bank share describes the percent of the banking system's assets in 
banks that are public-controlled 
Since regions with different economic development will tend to have different financing 
obstacles, we control for GDP per capita in order to distinguish between the influence of market 
structure and general economic standard. We also care about the legal and institutional 
environment that probably affects the access to credit, thus we collected data from Institutional 
Development which is an average of six indicators representing voice and accountability, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption, political stabilities, and effectiveness of 
government respectively. We use the data from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) as 
the institutional development in the economics of our sample didn’t change too much in the past 
ten years.  
Regulatory structure of banking system is also one of the aspects we want to control for. 
Regarding regulatory restriction and government interference, we have the following four 
indicators. Restrict is the average index proxying for the extent to which the bank may engage in 
the security, insurance and real estate activities, and the extent to which banks may own and 
control non-financial firms. The number doesn’t convey mean, but higher value denotes more 
restriction on bank activities. Fraction denied is the degree to which the application to enter 
banking are denied. It is comprised of domestic by indicating a value of 0 or 1. Both these two 
indicators come from World Bank surveys on bank regulation conducted in 2011. Credit 
Registry reports the number of individuals and firms listed in private or public registry with 
information of repayment history, credit outstanding, etc. This indicator is an aggregate of both 
public and private data where a higher value suggests the availability of more complete 
information. We use Banking freedom to measure how freely the banks can be operated under 
the regulation of government which ensure the basic transparency and integrity of banking 
system. Data can be obtained from the Heritage Foundation and it varies from 1 to 90 with huge 
variation.  
The ownership structure and credit development can also put an impact on the relation between 
bank concentration and financing access. Public bank share describes the percent of the banking 
system's assets in banks that are publically-controlled, while foreign bank share describes the 
percent of the banking system's assets in banks that are foreign-controlled. Credit development 
can be reflected by private credit, which refers to the financial credit offered to private sector by 
financial institution as share of GDP. This indicator is provided by the World Bank database.  
Other variables to be controlled for include GDP growth rate as we assume higher financial 
barriers impede economy growth and vice versa. Inflation rate represents the stability of 
monetary environment, and firms tend to face less trouble when they borrow money in a stable 
economy.  
As Table 3 shows, more concentrated market structure corresponds to better institutional and 
economic development, more banking freedom and credit registry as well as a larger foreign-
owned share. This correlation makes sense in the emerging and developing countries. Normally, 
the evolvement of finance industry in the developing country start from few banks, resulting in a 
concentrated market structure. With substantial market share of banking sector, those big banks 
have more initiative to ensure the accessibility and health of credit business. In the range of less 
developed economics, the country with faster economic development will have faster upgrade in 
the financial market structure, which is more concentrated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
	  Figure 1 Banking Concentration across countries.  
Concentration is calculated as share of asset in five largest banks in terms of deposits.  
(Source: The World Bank Survey, 2011) 
Methodology  
	  
To estimate the effect of bank concentration on financing obstacles, we use the following model: 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑙𝑒!,!= 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗! + 𝛽!𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛!,! + 𝛽!𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟!,!+ 𝛽!𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑠!,! + 𝛽!𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔!,! + 𝛽!𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒!,!+ 𝛽!𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!,! + 𝛽!𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛! + 𝛽!𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ! + 𝛽!"𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛! + 𝜀!,! 
Given that Financing Obstacle is a polychotomous dependent variable with a natural order, we 
use the ordered probit model to estimate Regression (1). We assume that the disturbance 
parameter has a normal distribution and use standard maximum likelihood estimation.  
To assess whether bank concentration has a different effect on firms depending on their size, we 
interact concentration with dummy variables indicating whether the firm is small (5-50 
employees), medium-size (51-500 employees) or large (more than 500 employees). The industry 
dummies correct for industry-specific effects.  
 
Results 
	  
In general, Table 3 displays the result which point out that firms face stricter barriers to financial 
credit in less concentrated banking systems, which is the opposite of results gained by Thorsten, 
Asly and Vojislav (2004). In Column 1, the coefficient of the concentration parameter is 
significantly negative, demonstrating contrary movement between market powers and financing 
obstacle. Petersen and Rajan (1995) highlight this potential incompatibility between bank 
competition and the establishment of close lending relationships. In column 2, we include the 
dummy variables for small, medium and large firms and interact them with bank concentration 
respectively. All the three interaction coefficients enter significantly negative with the 
significance level remaining at the 0%. Moreover, the interaction with Large is highest, 
providing some evidence that large firms have less difficulty in borrowing money in 
concentrated banking systems. This growth-impeding effect of bank concentration has been 
studied by other researchers and it has been proved that larger firms have greater relative access 
to short term and long-term loans, especially in downturns.  
Further, we control for GDP per capita, and the concentration turns out to be significantly 
negative (column 4). The same result applies to GDP per capita when we introduce its interaction 
with concentration, but the significance test of interaction failed (column 5). Without significant 
coefficient of interaction, we cannot assess the influence of economic development to the robust 
relation between market structure and firms’ access to external financing. However, as GDP per 
capita is negative in both regression processes, we can at least predict that more advanced 
countries face fewer financing barriers.  
Moreover, other variables in Table 3 illustrate their relations with financing obstacle. The 
coefficient of the variable capturing inflation with financing obstacles is positive and statistically 
significant, providing some evidence that countries of lower inflation face lower financing 
obstacles. With other indicators unchanged, positive Manufacturing and negative Service imply 
that manufacturing sector will have an easier time than service sector when comes to external 
financing from banks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
Table 3             	  	  
CONCENTRATION AND FINANCING OBSTACLE 
      Financing obstacle 
Financing 
obstacle 
Financing 
obstacle 
Financing 
obstacle 	  	  
Domestic 
  
0.194 0.183 0.194 0.194 	  
   
(0.026)** (0.035)** (0.024)** (0.024)** 	  
Foreign 
  
-0.008 0.027 0.011 0.010 	  
   
(0.902) (0.685) (0.868)* (0.872) 	  
Government 
 
-0.260 -0.221 -0.136 -0.136 	  
   
(0.036)** (0.076)* (0.268) (0.267) 	  
Manufacturing 
 
0.025 0.042 0.034 0.034 	  
   
(0.101) (0.007)*** (0.023)** (0.023)** 	  
Services 
  
-0.036 -0.054 -0.042 -0.042 	  
   
(0.020)** (0.001)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** 	  
Sales 
  
-0.027 -0.010 -0.046 -0.046 	  
   
(0.000)*** (0.108) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 	  
Competition 
 
0.237 0.235 0.213 0.213 	  
   
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 	  
Inflation 
  
1.334 1.075 0.509 0.513 	  
   
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.012)** (0.012)** 	  
Growth 
  
-0.335 -0.185 0.393 0.397 	  
   
(0.121) (0.396) (0.070)* (0.069)* 	  
Concentration 
 
-1.302  -0.436 -0.361 	  
   
(0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.544) 	  
Concentration* Small  -1.193    
   
 (0.000)***    
Concentration * Medium  -1.472    
   
 (0.000)***    
Concentration* Large  -1.621    
   
 (0.000)***    
GDP per capita 
 
  -0.236 -0.230 	  
   
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 	  
Concentration * GDP per capita   -0.010 	  
   
   (0.898) 	  
R^2 
  
0.084 0.086 0.100 0.112 
	  Observation    12933 12933 12933 12933 
	   
NOTES: The equation is 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑙𝑒 = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 + 𝛽!𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽!𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 + 𝛽!𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 +𝛽!𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽!𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽!𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽!𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽!𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝛽!"𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜀. Financing obstacle is the 
numerical response of the question: In access to financing, which includes availability and cost (interest rates, fees and collateral 
requirements), how much obstacle is there to the current operations of this establishment? Domestic, Government and Foreign 
are dummy variables that take on one if the firm is owned by domestic, government or foreign organization. Manufacture and 
service takes on 1 f firm operates in manufacturing or service industry, 0 if not. Sale is the natural logarithm of 2011 firm data. 
Competition is the numeric response of question: “Do you think that the practices of competitors in the informal sector are No 
Obstacle, a Minor Obstacle, a Major Obstacle, or a Very Severe Obstacle to the current operations of this establishment?” 
Concentration is share of 5 largest banks in banking system in terms of both deposits. Size is categories based on number of 
employees.  Small firm has no more than 20 people, median has 20 to 99 people and large firm has more than 100 people. The p-
value of coefficient is reported in bracket. *, ** and *** express significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
When we control for the size of firm and vary the extent of bank concentration, the change of 
financing obstacle based on the regression tells the same story, as shown in Table 4. Here we set 
all variables to their actual value, while change the concentration to 25%, 50%, 75% of its value. 
By moving bank concentration gradually from 25% to 75%, we can observe the change of 
probability that firms report external financing as major obstacle. The negative effect of market 
structure to obstacle is stronger for large enterprises (11.3%) than for small-size enterprises (8%). 
Likewise in Table 1, the coefficient of interaction between concentration and large enterprises (-
1.621) is higher than that of interaction between concentration and small enterprises, indicating 
that large enterprises face fewer financing obstacles in more concentrated banking systems.  
Table 4 
CONCENTRATION AND FINANCING OBSTACLES---QUANTIFYING THE EFFECT 
Bank concentration 25% 50% 75% 
Change 
between 25% 
and 75% 
percentiles 
Based on regression 
Average estimated probability that establishment will rate access to finance as major obstacle  
All enterprises 0.474 0.428 0.383 -0.091 Table3, column 1 
Small enterprises 0.470 0.408 0.387 -0.083 Table3, column 2 
Medium enterprises 0.461 0.409 0.358 -0.103 Table3, column 2 
Large enterprises 0.455 0.399 0.342 -0.113 Table3, column 2 
 
NOTES: Based on the regression result in the table3, insert the real value of all the variables except for concentration. Each time 
use 25%, 50% and 75% of concentration and calculate the probably that firm will evaluate the external financing as major 
obstacle (financing obstacle=4). 
 
The market share of the three largest banks is only one dimension of the competitiveness of the 
banking sectors. In table 5, we gradually incorporate indicators of the regulatory restriction and 
again, interact them with concentration while holding GDP per capita constant. In column 1, the 
correlation between institutional development and financing obstacles is significantly positive, 
indicating that government interference in the banking systems improves the financing 
conditions, especially after financial crisis, when regulation on banking systems are stricter and 
require more capital and limitations regarding lending to firms. Both concentration and its 
interaction with institutional development become significantly negative, and the size of 
coefficients indicate that there doesn’t exist any country with institutional development index 
that can offset the concentration effect on financing obstacle. 
The banking freedom variables also provide the closest measure of how freely the financial 
institution can operate without government interference. Column 2 shows that both the 
concentration and banking freedom enter positively and significantly, while the interaction with 
concentration is significantly negative. The magnitude of the coefficients demonstrate that  less 
government interference in banking can decrease the relation of concentration with financing 
obstacles and that there is positive relation between concentration and financing obstacles if 
banking freedom is less than Eritrea (38.49). We also look at fraction denied and restrict. All of 
the coefficients pass the 1% significance test. Restrict ( Column 3)  enters positively as 
concentration, whereas the interaction enter negatively which means more restrictions on the 
banking activities can dampen the association between market structure and financing obstacle. 
The regression on fraction denied conveys the similar idea as concentration and fraction denied 
enter negatively while their interaction enter contrarily. The result can be understood that the 
banking concentration put no effect on the financing obstacle in a country with almost half of the 
application to enter banking being denied. The credit registry can’t indicate anything as it doesn’t 
pass significance test, but its interaction with banking concentration suggest a more well-
functioned credit registry system tend to weaken the link between banking centralization and the 
difficulty of external financing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 5               
Concentration and Financing Obstacles—the Interaction with the Regulation of the Banking Sector 
   
Financing 
Obstacles 
Financing 
Obstacles 
Financing 
Obstacles 
Financing 
Obstacles 
Financing 
Obstacles 
Concentration 
 
-1.330 1.769 3.407 -0.904 -0.639 
   
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
GDP per capita 
 
-0.339 -0.273 -0.250 -0.231 -0.371 
   
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Institutional development 0.892 
    
   
(0.000)*** 
    Concentration* 
 
-0.712 
    Institutional development (0.000)*** 
    
        Banking freedom 
  
0.028 
   
    
(0.000)*** 
   Concentration* 
  
-0.047 
   Banking	  freedom	  
	    
(0.000)***	  
	     
        Restrict 
    
0.163 
  
     
(0.000)*** 
  Concentration* 
   
-0.384 
  Restrict 
    
(0.000)*** 
  
        Fraction Denied 
    
-0.895 
 
      
(0.000)*** 
 Concentration* 
    
2.116 
 Fraction Denied 
    
(0.000)*** 
 
        Credit registry 
     
-0.006 
       
(0.971) 
Concentration* 
     
0.848 
Credit registry 
     
(0.001)*** 
        R-square 
  
0.1348 0.1187 0.1281 0.1159 0.115 
Observation    12933 12933 12933 12933 12933 
 
NOTES: The equation is financing  obstacle = α + β!domestic + β!government + β!foreign + β!manufacturing +β!service + β!sales + β!competition + β!inflation + β!growth + β!"concentration + β!!GDP  per  capita +β!"regualation + β!"regulation ∗ concentration + ε. Financing obstacle is the numerical response of the question: In access to 
financing, which includes availability and cost (interest rates, fees and collateral requirements), how much obstacle is there to the 
current operations of this establishment? Domestic, Government and Foreign are dummy variables that take on one if the firm is 
owned by domestic, government or foreign organization. Manufacture and service takes on one if firm operates in manufacturing 
or service industry, 0 if not. Sale is the natural logarithm of 2011 firm data. Competition is the numeric response of question: “Do 
you think that the practices of competitors in the informal sector are No Obstacle, a Minor Obstacle, a Major Obstacle, or a Very 
Severe Obstacle to the current operations of this establishment?” Concentration is share of 5 largest banks in banking system in 
terms of both deposits. Restrict is the measure of the extent to which the bank financial activities. Banking freedom is the degree 
of government interference in the banking system. Inflation rate takes the value of 2011. Credit Registry is the number of 
individuals and firms listed in private or public registry as share of population. Institution development is the average indicator of 
voice and accountability, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption, political stabilities, and effectiveness of 
government respectively. Fraction denied is the indicator of government’s restriction to enter the bank sector. The p-value of 
coefficient is reported in bracket. *, ** and *** express significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
Further, we control for financial intermediary development and the ownership structure of 
banking systems, and interact these variables with bank concentration (Table 6). The negative 
concentration and the positive interaction with private credit indicates that development of 
financial intermediary can turn the relation between market structure and financing obstacle from 
negative to positive, and an appropriate level of private credit can eventually eliminate the 
association. While the concentration doesn’t enter significantly, its interaction with foreign bank 
share enters significantly and negatively, suggesting that the presence of foreign banks makes 
firms face fewer financing obstacles in more concentrated countries. On the other hand, the 
interaction of bank concentration with public bank share enters positively, indicating that public 
bank ownership improves the level of financing obstacles. It can be reasonable if the local banks 
can take the advantage of foreign countries’ advanced financial practice and apply them into the 
financing process. With more comprehensive knowledge in conducting loans, banks gain the 
incentives to expand the amount of borrowers and increase the efficiency of lending. 
	  
Table 6                 
Concentration and Financing Obstacles—the Interaction with the Structure of the Banking Sector 
   
Financing 
Obstacles 
 
Financing 
Obstacles 
 
Financing 
Obstacles 
 Concentration 
 
-2.842 
 
0.228 
 
-1.155 
 
   
(0.000)*** 
 
(0.235) 
 
(0.000)*** 
 GDP per capita 
 
-0.122 
 
-0.273 
 
-0.269 
 
   
(0.000)*** 
 
(0.000)*** 
 
(0.000)*** 
 Private Credit 
 
-3.300 
     
   
(0.000)*** 
     Concentration* 
 
3.770 
     Private Credit 
 
(0.000)*** 
     
         Foreign bank share 
   
1.190 
   
     
(0.000)*** 
   Concentration* 
   
-1.615 
   Foreign bank share 
   
(0.000)*** 
   
         Public bank share  
     
-2.346 
 
       
(0.000)*** 
 
Concentration* 
     
3.848 
 Public bank share  
     
(0.000)*** 
 
         R-square 
  
0.1265 
 
0.1157 
 
0.1116 
 Observation    12933   12933   12933   
	  
NOTES: The equation is financing  obstacle = α + β!domestic + β!government + β!foreign + β!manufacturing +β!service + β!sales + β!competition + β!inflation + β!growth + β!"concentration + β!!GDP  per  capita + β!"Bank +β!"Bank ∗ concentration + ε. Financing obstacle is the numerical response of the question: In access to financing, which 
includes availability and cost (interest rates, fees and collateral requirements), how much obstacle is there to the current 
operations of this establishment? Domestic, Government and Foreign are dummy variables that take on one if the firm is owned 
by domestic, government or foreign organization. Manufacture and service takes on one if firm operates in manufacturing or 
service industry, 0 if not. Sale is the natural logarithm of 2011 firm data. Competition is the numeric response of question: “Do 
you think that the practices of competitors in the informal sector are No Obstacle, a Minor Obstacle, a Major Obstacle, or a Very 
Severe Obstacle to the current operations of this establishment?” Concentration is share of 5 largest banks in banking system in 
terms of both deposits. Private credit refers to the financial credit offered to private sector by financial institution as share of GDP. 
Foreign bank share measures the percent of the banking system's assets in banks that are foreign-controlled and public bank share 
describes the percent of the banking system's assets in banks that are public-controlled. The p-value of coefficient is reported in 
bracket. *, ** and *** express significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
 
TABLE 7           
Comprehensive Regression on Concentration and Financing Obstacles     
  Financing Obstacle P-value   
Financing 
Obstacle P-value 
Domestic 0.317 (0.000)*** Banking Freedom -0.066 (0.000)*** 
Foreign -0.010 0.878 Banking Freedom* Concentration 0.082 (0.001)*** 
government -0.063 0.596 Restrict 0.129 (0.039)** 
 Manufacturing sector 0.087 (0.000)*** Restrict* Concentration -0.311 (0.002)*** 
Service sector -0.099 (0.000)*** Fraction Denied -0.184 0.622 
sales -0.037 (0.000)*** Fraction Denied* Concentration 0.155 0.840 
Competition 0.206 (0.000)*** Credit Registry -1.683 (0.001)*** 
inflation rate 0.497 0.604 Credit Registry* Concentration 3.371 (0.000)*** 
GDP growth rate -0.627 0.150 Private Credit -9.180 (0.000)*** 
Concentration 11.284 (0.008)*** Private Credit* Concentration 14.561 (0.000)*** 
log(GDP) 1.162 (0.010)*** Foreign Bank Share 1.617 (0.082)* 
log(GDP)* 
Concentration -2.686 (0.000)*** 
Foreign bank Share* 
Concentration -1.508 0.259 
Institutional 
Development 0.383 0.491 Public Bank Share 1.077 0.642 
Institutional 
Development* 
Concentration 
0.218 0.834 Public Bank Share* Concentration 0.708 0.848 
 
We also put all variables into regression so as to explore if any variable has significant effect on 
financing obstacles. From table 7, we can see the interaction coefficient of Private Credit, Credit 
Registry and GDP with concentration enter significantly, while the interaction of coefficient of 
Banking Freedom and Restrict with concentration enter insignificantly. We can attain the same 
relation between private credit interacted with concentration and financing obstacles that an 
appropriate level of private credit can eventually eliminate the association between concentration 
and financing obstacles. Also, banking freedom and restrict do not have much influence on the 
relation between concentration and financing obstacles. 
Conclusions 
	  
Our paper analyzed the relationship between competition in banking systems and financing 
obstacles faced by firms. We conclude that with more bank concentration firms face fewer 
financing obstacles, and large enterprises can access credit easier than small and medium 
enterprises. When we include GDP per capita and an interaction with bank concentration, we 
find that enterprises face fewer financing obstacles in higher GDP per capita when the level of 
concentration is the same. In line with the original paper, we also find that the level of 
economicdevelopment, regulatory and institutional country characteristic as well as the 
ownership structure of the banking system influence the relation between bank concentration and 
financing obstacles. A high level of institutional development and the presence of foreign-owned 
banks dampen the effect of banking concentration on financing obstacles. On the other hand, the 
relationship is exacerbated in countries with more restrictions and limitations on banks’ activities, 
higher government interference in the banking system and more government-owned banks.  
Our results provide evidence for theories that focus on the potential positive effects of bank 
concentration which is inconsistent with theories that stress the negative effects of bank power. 
54% of countries in our sample are emerging countries, where banking systems are inefficient 
and more concentration provides comparative advantage in monitoring, flexible lending and 
intertemporal consumption smoothing which is trivial for economic development.   
More research is clearly needed on the topic of bank concentration and competition. One useful 
direction for future research is likely to be additional focus on developing countries and their 
problems of credit availability, economic growth and financial stability. Along these lines, more 
detailed analyses of how regulatory and supervisory policies influence bank and overall 
economic performance may provide policy makers with considerably improved information for 
formulating banking sector policies.  
The results of the paper have relevance for developing economies and emerging economies, 
where there are government-sponsored programs or micro banking, which affect credit market 
structure, aim at providing higher levels of welfare.  
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